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The Life and Death of Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit 
 
                                            Michael Godwin and Colin Lawson 
 
 
Abstract 
The Tax Credits system introduced in the UK by the previous Labour government is 
from 2013 to be replaced by a Universal Benefit system. The new system should 
have some major potential advantages, provided it avoids the problems experienced 
with the Tax Credit system. The paper reviews and updates previous research on 
Tax Credits and sets out recommendations for the design and administration of 
future welfare benefit systems, drawing on critical analyses of the Tax Credit system.  
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Introduction 
Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit (CTCs and WTCs, collectively TCs) were a 
substantial social support programme introduced in 2003, which delivered 
unprecedented financial support to working families during the past decade, 
contributing to “The previous government had a target of halving the number of 
children in relative low (BHC) income poverty in the UK between 1998–99 and 2010–
11, from 3.4 million to 1.7 million. We now know that this measure of child poverty fell 
by 1.1 million children over the period. This is by far the largest reduction since our 
consistent series began in 1961, but the target was still missed by the substantial 
margin of 600,000 children” (Cribb et al.,2012:5).  
 
TCs are about to be subsumed in the new Universal Credit (UC). Now that the 
demise of this major New Labour social policy has been announced, it is timely to 
assess its successes and failures. This article builds on the analysis of the period 
2003-08 by Godwin and Lawson (2009a, 2009b). It investigates, using both official 
and unofficial published sources, how the programme has developed during its final 
years, and assesses the issues that the new Universal Credit will face in the light of 
the tax credit experience. It concludes with a set of recommendations for the design 
of the administration of future welfare programmes, drawing lessons from the Tax 
Credit experience. 
  
 
Rationale and Design 
The New Labour administration was elected in 1997 with a commitment to support 
poor, working families.  Taylor, the adviser who recommended the new support 
system, suggested a structure influenced by the US Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC); the Australian system and the Canadian systems of working taxpayer support 
(Taylor, 1998). Taylor emphasised that tax credits should be distinct from benefits; to 
this end, he argued that is was desirable that they should be paid via the employer 
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(PVE) as part of remuneration rather than directly by government. This applied to the 
Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), the initial attempt at tax credits (1999-2003), 
and subsequently to the Working Tax Credit, though not to the Child Tax Credit. The 
Working Families Tax Credit offered payment via the employer, but following a ‘purse 
or wallet’ argument (Goode et al.,1998), there was always an option for couples to 
have WFTC paid direct to a non-working spouse.  
 
However problems with take-up and fraud arose soon after the introduction of WFTC. 
As much as 10 per cent to14 per cent of expenditure was thought to be fraudulent, 
and the benefit was withdrawn after less than four years of operation (October 1999 - 
April 2003). A training organisation interviewed by the present authors (Godwin and 
Lawson, 2009b :193) expressed the view that “WFTC was complicated: you could 
fiddle the system by working for only six weeks, but getting six months’ benefit. 
Employees would ask payroll to put overtime or bonuses on next months’ pay in 
order to continue to qualify. It is much more difficult to fiddle under WTC”.  
 
Brewer (2006a:31), giving evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Committee 
on the administration of tax credits said “The scope for… gaming the system in the 
current system of tax credits is of course much less than under the Working Families 
Tax Credit, because in the Working Families Tax Credit there were periods of time 
where the Revenue was not looking at your income and periods where it was”. 
 
The launch of Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit 
The system introduced in April 2003 split the WFTC into two separate credits, the 
Working Tax Credit which was compulsorily paid via the employer (with no option for 
direct payment) and the Child Tax Credit which could be paid direct to the carer. It 
soon became clear that the Revenue and the computer system to deal with claims 
were quite unprepared for the number and type of queries which the new system 
generated among claimants. The system had been set up by EDS, a contractor who 
had frequently provided computer services to the UK government.  
 
Davies (2007:60) described the events: “Exactly what happened between the 
announcement of the new tax credit schemes and their disastrous launch in April 
2003 is the stuff of Whitehall legend. The challenge of building an IT system that 
could cope with these new demands fell to the vast American company EDS, and it 
notoriously failed to rise to it… Delays varied from a few days to several months: over 
400,000 applicants received their first payment later than they had been told to 
expect, while by 2nd July 220,000 people had still not been paid. The Revenue was 
forced to make 200,000 emergency payments, and call centres were swamped, with 
over 2m calls made on some days. The Inland Revenue had received a rude 
awakening to its new sphere of responsibility, as women arrived in tax offices with 
their children asking how they were expected to feed them that week”.  
 
At the start of the programme, telephone helplines were overwhelmed with enquiries. 
They were undermanned by inadequately trained staff, with the result that many 
claimants received incorrect advice or failed to get through to the helplines at all.  
 
For employers to operate the system without unnecessary over and underpayments 
they required start and stop notices in real time order. The Inland Revenue`s 
computer did not always achieve this basic objective. Sometimes stop notices were 
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issued for employees for whom there was no start notice. Moreover employers 
received many more amendment notices than the Revenue had predicted. In our 
survey, one payroll manager commented: ‘Six changes in a month is excessive… but 
last month one worker got four tax credit changes simultaneously’ (Godwin and 
Lawson, 2009b:192). 
 
Eventually the contract with EDS, along with other government contracts, was 
terminated and transferred to another company, Cap Gemini. 
 
Numerous official and welfare rights group reports have criticised the administration 
of tax credits, including the  Child Poverty Action Group (Howard, 2004), Citizens 
Advice Bureau (Lane and Wheatley, 2005), the National Council for One Parent 
Families (Griggs et al., 2005), the Parliamentary Ombudsman (2005),  and the Public 
Accounts Committee of the House of Commons (2006).  The introduction of CTC and 
WTC was criticised as a ‘debacle’ in the influential Mirrlees Review (Shaw et al., 
2010:1103). 
 
Employer Compliance Issues 
Godwin and Lawson (2009b) carried out a series of forty case study interviews with 
employers, training organisations and payroll bureaux about the changeover from 
WFTC to WTC. The sample included five payroll bureaux, four training organisations, 
and thirty-one employers with work forces varying from 13 to 27,000. Between them 
the interviewees represented a very large number and a very wide range of 
employees and clients.  
 
TCs had a very inequitable compliance impact, depending on the pay rates and 
employment structure of the workforce. Over half the interviewees suggested that the 
costs were “minimal”, and comments reporting problems and high costs of operating 
WTC came from only a minority of respondents. Five respondents gave a figure of 
ten per cent or more of payroll costs, especially among firms with high labour 
turnover, which was a key variable driving compliance costs. Respondent firms in low 
pay industries, such as retailing, cleaning and catering reported extensive problems 
with the operation of WTC; and some large employers had encountered multiple 
problems. Responsible employers offered advice services to employees and took up 
their cases with the Revenue when they encountered errors. The majority of 
interviewees reported ‘many’ queries; some employers reported being ‘inundated’ 
and employees continued to seek advice even after PVE had ceased.  
 
WTC assessment began when an employee filed a claim with HMRC, including 
income and family information. For an accepted claim the employer was required to 
implement a start notice, which operated until either the employee left, entitlement 
stopped or was amended. Employers` National Insurance and PAYE payments were 
reduced to compensate their WTC pay outs.  
 
Employers should have had no role in WTC assessment, beyond confirming 
applicants` work hours. But the survey made clear that in practice many felt it a duty 
to help their employees receive their entitlements, or noticed HMRC errors, when 
responding to their employees` questions. Such questions were a significant 
compliance cost, the more so because employers did not know the basis for the 
Revenue`s decisions.  
4 
 
 
Employers` costs originated from a variety of factors. For example a successful claim 
might alert other employees to ask the employer if they also were eligible. Employers 
claimed to have had problems with the timing of start (paying WTC) and stop notices, 
to have received multiple notices, and because of intra-firm communication 
problems, to have been timely in stopping payments, for example because of 
employees leaving.   
 
 
It became apparent that with payment via the employer (PVE), costs were imposed in 
an uneven and inequitable manner on employers. Industries where low pay was 
widespread and labour turnover was high frequently had many WTC cases, whereas 
industries with high pay and low labour turnover encountered few WTC cases.  
 
There was also a suggestion that smaller employers were reluctant to employ more 
staff if they would have to operating WTC for them – exactly the opposite effect to 
that which the policy was designed to achieve. Many of our respondents pointed out 
such practices were illegal or unethical. But a small manufacturer with 14 employees 
said, ‘I would consider carefully before employing anyone who would need to claim’.  
 
Attempt at Reform: the Tax Credits Transformation Programme 
The Tax Credits Transformation Programme attempted to improve the administration 
of tax credits and to reduce overpayments and underpayments. “The aims of the 
Transformation Programme are to: create a tax credit service which is clearly 
understood and trusted by claimants and align that delivery with child benefit where it 
makes sense to do so; and ensure the right claimants receive the right money at the 
right time through a range of services and communications tailored to meet their 
individual needs and circumstances” (National Audit Office, 2009:42). It was 
recognised  that the Revenue’s  original ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to claimants had 
“paid little regard to claimants’ domestic or financial circumstances or their level of 
literacy and numeracy” – a costly error which the Department of Work and Pensions 
would have been less likely to make. The issue was highlighted in a newspaper 
interview by the then Comptroller and Auditor General, Sir John Bourne: “The thing 
about tax credits, and I find this just incredible, is the failure of imagination and 
sociological competence. A scheme has been designed in which we over-pay a lot of 
poor people, who often have trouble managing money. So when we later demand 
repayment that causes a great deal of anguish”. (Sunday Telegraph, 2006) 
 
It was found disproportionate risks came from a relatively small group of claimants - 
six per cent of claimants were responsible for 29 per cent of all losses. HMRC 
therefore started to group claimants according to the behaviour that led to the 
overpayment as well as their circumstances, and created a Debt Recovery Co-
ordination Group; tested a campaign-based approach to the recovery of debt; and 
trialled using the PAYE system to recover overpayments through Income Tax coding 
adjustments on a voluntary basis.  
 
The system of direct payment of WTC via the employer was abandoned in favour of 
direct payment in 2006 as experience demonstrated that employers were unwilling to 
take on the task of benefit administrators.  
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From 2003 to 2006, the first £2,500 of any difference between previous year and 
current year’s income was disregarded. The frequency of changes in income resulted 
in a new code of practice being instituted in 2006-7 under which this ‘disregard’ was 
increased tenfold to £25,000, so that if income rose by up to £25,000 in one year, the 
tax credit award for that year was unaffected, reducing the chance that overpayments 
would be generated. The estimated cost to the Exchequer was some £500m per 
year; subsequently the disregard was reduced to £10,000 in April 2011, and is 
expected to be further reduced to £5000 in April 2013. 
  
“The price paid for more responsiveness [than WFTC] has been the problem of 
overpayments and the attendant lack of certainty” (Brewer, 2006b:144).  Giving 
evidence to the Parliamentary Treasury Committee, Brewer commented that “If the 
reforms announced in the Pre-Budget Report do not work, then I cannot see anything 
else the Government could do to make tax credits more palatable to members of the 
public currently receiving it, other than scrapping it.  It would take another couple of 
years to assess whether the reforms were working … perhaps looking at years 
(Brewer (2006a:Ev31)”. 
 
Overpayment, Underpayment and Complaints 
The difficulties of assessing and collecting overpayments and underpayments on an 
annual basis has caused problems throughout the life of TCs. Substantial numbers of 
complaints were generated every year, and were reported on and the Adjudicator - 
the independent officer responsible for dealing with complaints against HM Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC) - highlighted a number of continuing problems with the tax 
credits system, including: delays in claimants receiving their correct entitlement; 
difficulties in contacting the tax credit helpline; failure by the Revenue to update 
claimants' records; payments made to the wrong bank account; and problems 
relating to the recovery of overpayments, including differing interpretations of the 
department's code of practice on overpayments (COP26). (Adjudicator’s Report 
2004-5), 
 
Most complaints have related to refusal to write off overpayments (Adjudicator’s 
Report 2011:18). After the reforms of the Tax Credit Transformation Programme (see 
below) complaints fell slightly, from 1543 in 2006/7 to 1451 in 2008/9 and 1239 in 
2009/10 (Adjudicator’s Report  2009 :8).  A serious backlog of 1509 tax credit cases 
built up (Adjudicator’s Report 2010:12). However, by 2010-1, the number of new 
complaints had fallen substantially to 766, enabling the backlog to be cleared, But 
even after these reforms, 66 per cent of complaints were upheld partly or 
substantially in the most recent year available (Adjudicator’s Report 2011:18).   
 
It can be seen from the Charts 1 and 2 that some control was exerted on 
overpayments after 2005-6, when they stood at £2.2bn (1.88 million cases). In 2006-
7 they were £1bn (1.45 million cases); but they then began to rise again, reaching 
£1.3bn by 2009-10.  
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Chart 1: Overpaid awards (£m)  
Terminated awards (blue) are those where claimants failed to report income by 
the due date, or to sign an award notice, or ceased to qualify; continuing 
awards are in mauve. Off-system and late overpayments are in white. 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
HMRC (2011b) Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics, Finalised annual awards 
2009-10: Supplement on payments in 2009-10  
www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-final-awards-supp-may11.pdf 
accessed 21/8/2012 
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Chart 2: Overpaid Awards (thousands)  
Terminated awards are shown in blue; continuing awards are in mauve.  
Off-system and late overpayments are omitted from this chart. 
 
 
 
Source: HMRC (2011b) Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics, Finalised annual 
awards 2009-10: Supplement on payments in 2009-10 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-final-awards-supp-may11.pdf 
accessed 21/8/2012 
 
Error and Fraud 
Error both by the Revenue, and error and fraud by claimants were substantial and 
have subsequently shown little sign of coming under control. HMRC’s latest estimate 
is that in 2010-11 error and fraud resulted in overpayments of between £2.08 billion 
and £2.46 billion, (between 7.5 and 8.8 per cent of total TCs expenditure). Error in 
favour of claimants has been substantial since 2003, but deliberate fraud has risen 
dramatically in the last four years, from 0.3 per cent to more than 2.0 per cent of 
finalised credits. Error was down to 5.7 per cent in 2010-11 from 7.9 per cent in 
2005-6. 
 
In December 2005, the “e-portal” used for on-line TC applications was closed after 
organised criminals used the stolen identities and personal details of public sector 
staff to make fraudulent online TC claims. Three years earlier HMRC had been 
warned to improve their security, but had  ‘failed to reassess the security of the 
internet channel at any point in the three years after the e-envoy’s guidance was 
issued’ (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2007:12). 
  
HMRC reassured Parliament that the tax credit e-portal would only be reopened 
when it was proofed against security breaches, but identity authentication proved 
difficult to achieve (Kennedy, 2008).  
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A second potential fraud problem involved single parents, 2.1 million of whom 
received CTC in 2005-6. But the 2006 Labour Force Survey estimated there were 
only 1.9 million single parents, using a slightly different definition (Brewer and Shaw, 
2006; Field and Cackett, 2007).  
 
A third problem is caused by the incentive for both employees and employers to 
understate earnings. If they do then employees can claim more benefits and pay less 
tax and National Insurance, and employers can pay lower taxes and National 
Insurance. 
 
A fourth problem involves illegal benefit claims by non-residents. Because HMRC 
cannot single out specific national groups, there is no nationality question on the TC 
form, which hinders residency checks. The Public Accounts Committee also 
established that at least before 2007 HMRC had no capability to check whether a 
claimant`s non-resident child actually existed (Committee of Public Accounts, 2007). 
  
In July 2008, partly in response to such shortcomings HMRC announced a target to 
limit tax credit losses due to error and fraud to a maximum of five per cent of the 
value of finalised entitlement (NAO, 2011b:44). But this target was badly missed: in 
2010-2011 error alone was 5.7 per cent of finalised entitlement, and fraud was at a 
new high of 2.4 per cent (HMRC, 2012).  
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Chart 3 Error and Fraud by Claimants in Percentage terms: 
Error in blue, fraud in mauve 
 
 
Source: 
HMRC (2012) Child and Working Tax Credits Error and Fraud Statistics 2003-4 to 
2010-11, www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/error-fraud.htm accessed 
21/8/2012 
 
 
Chart 4 Error and Fraud by Claimants in £m: 
Error in blue, fraud in mauve 
 
 
Source:HMRC (2012) Child and Working Tax Credits Error and Fraud Statistics 
2003-4 to 2010-11, www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/error-fraud.htm 
accessed 21/8/2012 
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Error in favour of claimants has been running at around £1.1 – 1.6bn since 2003, but 
deliberate fraud rose dramatically in the last four years for which data are available, 
from £70m in 2003-4; £210m in 2007-8; £460m in 2008-10, and reached a new high 
of £670m in 2010-11.  
 
It is also worrying that administrative errors in favour of the Revenue are still 
substantial. The 2006-7 and 2007-8 reforms temporarily curbed the amount collected 
erroneously, but there was a further spike to a new peak of £400m in 2009-10. 
However the most recent figures show a reduction to the same order of magnitude as 
2003-4.  
 
Chart 5 Error in favour of HMRC in £m 
  
 
HMRC (2012) Child and Working Tax Credits Error and Fraud Statistics 2003-4 to 
2010-11, www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/error-fraud.htm 
accessed 21/8/2012 
 
TC`s administrative errors in favour of the Revenue were running at 1.9 per cent of 
finalised credits between 2003 and 2006, when an attempt was made to control 
them. The effort to control administrative error had an impact, as the most recent 
figure for 2010-11 is the lowest so far, at 0.8 per cent. 
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Chart 6 Error in Favour of HMRC in Per Cent 
  
HMRC (2012) Child and Working Tax Credits Error and Fraud Statistics 2003-4 to 
2010-11, www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/error-fraud.htm 
accessed 21/8/2012 
 
Take-up Issues 
It should be noted that take-up can be calculated by caseload or by expenditure. It is 
a feature of tax credits that the expenditure rates tend to be higher than the caseload 
rates, presumably because smaller amounts are less likely to be claimed. 
 
Take-up Issues and WFTC 
In its final year of 2002-3 the 1999 WFTC system encountered take-up problems in 
the range 72 to 76 per cent, though expenditure take-up was higher at 82 to 88 per 
cent (estimates are based on statistical procedures that are subject to a plus or 
minus 2 to 4 per cent error bar, described in Child Benefit, Child Tax Credit and 
Working Tax Credit Take-up Rates 2009-10 (HMRC, 2011a).   
 
It had been hoped that take-up would be increased under TCs, and take-up of CTC 
did improve to 81 per cent by caseload and 90 per cent by expenditure. However 
WTC take- up remained low – it evidently got off to an uncertain footing by the 
compulsory routing of the payment through the employer and has never been taken 
up by more than 61 per cent of claimants. Its average take-up of 59 per cent was 
even lower than the acknowledged unsatisfactory take-up of WFTC. But WTC 
attained 82 per cent by expenditure - more or less comparable to WFTC levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Chart 7: Take-Up of Working Tax Credit by Caseload and by Expenditure 
 
 
Source: Personal Tax Credits and Child Benefit: finalised award statistics - take-up 
rates, www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-take-up.htm 
(accessed 21/8/2012). 
 
In contrast, take-up of Child Tax Credit has been high throughout, averaging 81 per 
cent by caseload and 89 per cent by expenditure. This is interesting because CTC 
has always been paid directly from DWP to the claimant, unlike WTC.  
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Chart 8: Take-Up of Child Tax Credit by Caseload and by Expenditure 
 
 
Source: Personal Tax Credits and Child Benefit: finalised award statistics - take-up 
rates, www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-take-up.htm 
(accessed 21/8/2012). 
 
There have been estimates of WTC`s take-up shortcomings by household group and 
ethnic group. Single people without children form the largest non-claimant household 
group (HMRC, 2007a:12). Chinese and Indian households’ take-up, by expenditure, 
has been estimated at, respectively, 23 per cent and 19 per cent less than that of 
White households. But take-up for Pakistani and Black households is only 5 per cent 
less than that of White households (HMRC, 2007b:9).  
 
Take-up for lone parents, at 80 per cent, is vastly greater than the 55 per cent for 
couples (McKay, 2003:3,54). Field and Cackett (2007:25) explain this discrepancy by 
noting that a couple`s joint income is used to assess their WTC entitlement. In 
addition, because WTC is paid at a higher rate than was WFTC, this improved the 
work incentives facing single parents or the first earner in a couple, while lowering 
that for the second. 
 
Reputational Damage to HM Revenue and Customs 
The National Audit Office (NAO) and many other bodies have repeatedly criticised 
HMRC’s administration of tax credits. As early as their 2005-6 report they 
commented on the fact that organised fraudsters were targeting TCs. "The 
Department … needs to improve its collection rate for tax credits debt, which is 
substantially lower than that for tax debts” stated the head the NAO in 2010. 
Continuing failure to eliminate administrative error in the operation of the Tax Credit 
system has resulted in HMRC having their accounts qualified by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General in every year since their introduction.  In a summary of work on 
HMRC, the NAO reported that:  “since the introduction of working tax credits and 
child tax credits in 2003 we have qualified our opinion on the regularity of this 
expenditure because of the estimated levels of error and fraud” (National Audit 
Office, 2011a:12). Accordingly, the reputation of HMRC for administrative 
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competence has fallen, and it has come as little surprise that the body chosen to 
administer Universal Credit will be the DWP, not HMRC. 
 
Comparison with Universal Credit 
In 2010, the new Coalition administration announced its intention of introducing a 
new Universal Credit (UC) to be administered by the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) to take effect from autumn 2013. This would co-ordinate the 
administration of CTC and WTC, Housing Benefit, income-related Job Seekers 
Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance, and Income Support. 
 
It is claimed that take-up rates will be improved “By creating a single, integrated 
benefit, households who claim Universal Credit will now automatically receive 
everything they are entitled to …The new system ensures that someone either claims 
everything (because they are eligible) or nothing (because they are ineligible)… with 
this much simpler system, households will be more likely to claim their full 
entitlement… By virtue of the changes to entitlement and improved take up, 
Universal Credit will have a substantial positive impact on poverty, for both children 
and adults: Universal Credit could lift as many as 350,000 children and 500,000 
working-age adults out of poverty” (DWP 2010b: 52). 
 
The Universal Credit should end the complex system of annual reconciliations, by 
obtaining data direct from the new PAYE computer rather than relying on 
respondents’ reports of their incomes. This will eliminate the issues of overpayment 
and underpayment which dogged TCs. “Overpayments and subsequent repayments 
can create serious cash-flow problems, making it even more difficult for [people] to 
manage their finances. A simpler and fairer system could…reduce the scope for error 
and fraud” (DWP, 2010a:6).  It will reduce fraud and error because it will be easier to 
understand and will not rely on claimants’ self-reported earnings. 
 
A single organisation will deliver Universal Credit, enabling this waste and 
inefficiency to be eliminated (although Council Tax Benefit and its successor benefits 
will be excluded). It was no surprise when the new administration decided that the 
Universal Credit would be better handled by the DWP which already administers the 
main out of work benefits and operates employment and labour market services, than 
by HMRC. 
 
The transition from Tax Credits to Universal Credit will be gradual: The new HMRC 
real-time earnings system will be piloted from April 2012, with the aim of going live by 
April 2013. There will be a direct link with HMRC’s new real-time PAYE system, a link 
which was not made under Tax Credits. The first Universal Credit cases will be taken 
on in October 2013 and the last Tax Credit cases will be accepted in April 2014. Final 
transfer of existing TC cases to Universal Credit is targeted for October 2017.   
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
After a catastrophic start, the Tax Credits programme never really solved the 
endemic problems associated with its error-proneness and scope for fraud, which 
has worsened rather than improved over its life. Fraud increased dramatically from 
£40 million in 2006-7 to £460 million in 2008-9. The most recent estimate, for 2010-
11, is a new high of £670 million. The latter is the mid-point of a confidence interval 
for final expenditure of between £540m and £800m, based on a random sample of 
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4000 claimants. Since the 2006 reforms the cumulative amount of misappropriated 
revenue is roughly £1.25billion.  
 
The term ‘Credits’ has been retained from Taylor’s original recommendations, but 
much else has gone by the board.  He argued that calling the payment a tax credit 
would reduce stigma and so raise its take-up rate. HM Treasury (1998) accepted this 
hypothesis. He also suggested that delivering the credit through the employer would 
‘reinforce the distinction between the rewards of work and remaining on welfare’ 
(Taylor, 1998:22). He speculated that ‘A tax credit will associate the payment in the 
recipient’s mind with the fact of working, a potentially valuable psychological change’ 
(Taylor, 1998:8). It is worth noting that when the WFTC was introduced, no evidence 
was presented on this ‘potentially valuable psychological change’. It is hard to see 
quite how the psychological change would have been necessarily associated with 
PVE.  
 
It would appear that Taylor did not appreciate that while it is normal for US and 
Australian taxpayers to file an annual return and receive a repayment of overpaid tax 
(Hodgson and Boden, 2008:40), in the UK most employed workers are taxed under 
cumulative PAYE, which is designed to calculate total tax correctly, so they have no 
need to claim a rebate at the year end. Thus only a minority of UK taxpayers file 
annual tax returns. Indeed about a third of UK adults are below the income tax 
threshold, so have no other contact with the Revenue apart from their Tax Credit 
claim (Browne, 2012). In an interview several years after the introduction of TCs, 
Taylor conceded that "If I had my time over again, I'd shout louder about the dangers 
involved, and warn them against overloading the tax system” (Davis, 2007:58). It is 
perhaps both interesting and curious that a government advisor has recently 
suggested that overpayment and subsequent rebates of income tax should be 
instituted in the UK (McSmith, 2012). Experience with Tax Credits suggests that this 
plan would be fraught with risk.  
 
Even so, Tax Credits delivered unprecedented financial support to working families 
during the past decade - “the largest reduction [of child poverty] … since 1961” (Cribb 
et al, 2012:5).  
 
By 2011, 6.4 million families, containing 10.3 million children, were receiving tax 
credits or equivalent child support through benefits. Two million of the families were 
receiving both CTC and WTC, while 0.6 million were receiving only WTC (HMRC, 
2011b). 
 
It is anticipated that some CTC and WTC cases will continue alongside the new 
Universal Credit system until 2017.  It is to be hoped that Universal Credit will 
overcome many of the disadvantages that were encountered with Tax Credits. The 
exclusion of Council Tax Benefit from the new system has also been criticised (Adam 
and Browne, 2012). The current administration appears to be divided between 
‘centralisers’, who favour country-wide structures, and ‘decentralisers’, who argue for 
local variations in policies. The proposed restructuring of Council Tax Benefit, to 
allow local authorities some choice in its local application, appears to be a victory for 
decentralisers - won at the cost of excluding these payments from the Universal 
Credit system, so weakening the case for that system. 
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It is a commonplace in compliance cost literature that no matter how unwieldy a 
system, the costs of change to another system are always likely to be large. The 
experience with TCs suggests several improvements are needed. The Tax Credit 
Transformation Programme tackled some of the unsatisfactory features of TCs, but 
there have since been worrying signs that problems such as organised fraud remain 
unsolved. The parallel operation of TCs and UC between 2013 and 2017 may offer 
more opportunities to fraudsters. 
 
Recommendation 1 An explosion of fraud and error, like that from 2007-8 to 2009-
10, requires an explosion of anti-fraud and anti-error measures. 
  
The overall level of TC error and fraud, at 8.1 per cent, is more than three times the 
current average of 2.1 per cent for DWP-administered benefits. The switching of 
administration of Universal Credit to DWP is a clear admission that HMRC was 
unsuited to the task of benefit administration. 
 
Recommendation 2 Pay benefits through a specialist benefit agency, not through 
tax raising agencies. 
 
Recommendation 3 Do not pay benefits through the employer – WTC`s low take-up 
may in part have been a result of PVE.   
 
Recommendation 4 Avoid radical new delivery software. The link to HMRC`s new 
‘Agile’ computer system, currently under testing, is a key feature of the Universal 
Credits programme, and there are already doubts about it (Seddon and Thornton, 
2011). It is also unclear how the ‘real-time’ system will cope with the self-employed 
and their expenses. 
 
Recommendation 5 Minimise overpayments, because they are difficult to recover.  
 
Recommendation 6 Avoid payment systems that involve complex cumulative annual 
entitlement calculations.  
 
Whiteford et al. (2003) state that the Canadian system worked well because it was 
designed to be less responsive to small changes in income, but the UK system, 
following Australia, aimed to be very responsive. It is clear that WTC and CTC erred 
too far in the direction of complexity in pursuit of the laudable aim of responsiveness 
to changes. It is preferable to pay fixed awards, if only because disregards can be 
expensive. Factors that create administrative error should be targeted: it is to be 
hoped that this will be done under Universal Credit. 
 
References 
Adam S and Browne J, (2012) Reforming Council Tax Benefit, Commentary no. 123, 
London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, May, 8-9, www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm123.pdf  
(accessed 16.7.2012). 
 
Adjudicator’s Reports 2003 - 2011. 
http://www.adjudicatorsoffice.gov.uk/publications.htm ,(accessed 27.3.2012). 
 
17 
 
Brewer M (2006a) answers to Q180, 181 and 195, Treasury Committee,18 January. 
pp Ev30 – Ev33, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmtreasy/uc811-
ii/uc81102.htm , (accessed 27.3.2012). 
 
Brewer, M. (2006b) ‘Tax credits: fixed or beyond repair?’ IFS Green Budget, Institute 
for Fiscal Studies, pp. 133-148. http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2006/06chap7.pdf 
(accessed 27.3.2012). 
 
Brewer, M. and Shaw, J. (2006) How many lone parents are receiving tax credits? 
IFS Briefing Note 70, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn70.pdf  (accessed 21/8/2012). 
 
 
Brown, J (2012) `A £10,000 personal allowance: who would benefit, and would it 
boost the economy?` Institute for Fiscal Studies, March, 
www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6045 (accessed 16.7.2012).  
 
Cribb J, Joyce R and Phillips D (2012) in Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality in 
the UK: 2012, London, Institute for Fiscal Studies, www.ifs.org/comm124.pdf 
(accessed 16.7.2012). 
 
Davies, W, (2007) `Tax Credits: The Success and Failure`, Prospect Magazine, 30, 
June, 57-62. www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/taxcreditsthesucessandfailure   
(accessed 16.3.2012).  
 
Department for Work and Pensions (2010a) 21st Century Welfare, July, Cm 7913, 
www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/21st-century-welfare.pdf  (accessed 16.7.2012). 
 
Department for Work and Pensions (2010b) Universal Credit: Welfare That Works, 
November, Cm7957, Ch7, www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/universal-credit-full-document.pdf 
(accessed 21/8/2012). 
 
Field, F. and Cackett, B. (2007) Welfare isn’t working: Child poverty, London: 
Reform. 
 
Godwin, M. and Lawson, C. (2009a) `The Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit 
2003-08: a critical analysis` Benefits, 17, (1), 3-14. 
 
Godwin, M and Lawson, C (2009b) `Hidden Costs of the Welfare State: Employers’ 
Compliance Costs and the Working Tax Credit`, Social Policy and Society 8, (2), 
185-195. 
 
Goode, J., Lister, R. and Callendar, C. (1998), Purse or wallet? Gender inequalities 
and income distribution within families on benefit, London: Policy Studies Institute. 
 
Griggs J, McAllister M, Walker R (2005), The New Tax Credits System:  
Knowledge and Awareness Among Recipients.  London: National Council for One 
Parent Families. 
 
18 
 
HMRC Tax Credit Statistics and Estimates, 2004-5 to 2010-11, e.g. 
HMRC (2011) Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics, Finalised awards 
2007-8: Supplement on payments in 2007-8,  
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/ctcw-tax-credit-final-may09-sup.pdf 
(accessed 21/8/2012). 
 
HMRC (2007a) Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit: Take-up rates 2004-05. 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/takeup-rates2004-05.pdf 
(accessed 21/8/2012). 
 
HMRC (2007b) Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit: Take-up by ethnic group 
2004-05 www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/takeup-ethnicgroup0405.pdf 
(accessed 22/8/2012). 
 
HMRC (2011a) Child Benefit, Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit Take-up 
Rates 2009-10. www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-take-09-10.pdf 
(accessed 31.7.2012). 
 
HMRC (2011b) Child and Working Tax Credit Statistics, Finalised annual awards 
2009-10: Supplement on payments in 2009-10, London: HMSO. 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtc-final-awards-supp-may11.pdf  
(assessed 21/8/12).  
 
HMRC (2012) Child and Working Tax Credits Error and Fraud Statistics 2003-4 to 
2010-11. www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/cwtcredits-error1011.pdf 
(accessed 20.7.2012). 
 
Hodgson H and Boden R (2008) `Not-so-distant cousins: Family benefits in the 
United Kingdom and Australia`, International Social Security Review, 61, 3, 29-46. 
 
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2006) Inland Revenue: Tax 
Credits and Deleted Tax Cases, Fifth Report of Session 2005–06, HC 412 
(incorporating HC 269-i, Session 2004–05), House of Commons. 
 
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2007), Tax Credits, Twenty-
second Report of Session 2006–07, House of Commons.  
(www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubacc/487/487.pdf 
(accessed 20.7.2012). 
 
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2007) Minutes of evidence: Oral 
evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts on Monday 23 October 
2006, Q46-Q54.  
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubacc/487/6102301.htm 
(accessed 22/8/2012).  
 
HM Government (2011) Tackling Fraud and Error in Government: A Report of the 
Fraud, Error and Debt Taskforce, London: Cabinet Office. 
 
HM Treasury (1998), The Working Families Tax Credit and Work Incentives: The 
Modernisation of Britain’s Tax and Benefit System, No. 3, London: HM Treasury. 
19 
 
 
Inland Revenue (2005) Working Families’ Tax Credit: Estimates of Take-up rates in 
2002-03. London: Inland Revenue Analysis and Research ?LAST PART OF REF 
OK? No sign of any HMSO involvement. 
 
Howard, M (2004) Tax Credits – One Year On, London: Child Poverty Action Group.  
 
Inland Revenue Tax Credit statistics and estimates, 2003/4. London: Inland 
Revenue, HMSO. 
 
Kennedy J (2008) Hansard HC Deb, 4 March 2008, c2328W 
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2008-03-04d.190338.h  
(accessed 22/8/2012). 
 
Lane K and Wheatley J assisted by Bremner A, (2005), `Money with Your Name on 
It: CAB clients’ experience of tax credits` London, Citizens Advice Bureau and 
Citizens Advice Scotland. 
 
McKay, S. (2003) Working Families’ Tax Credit in 2001, DWP Research Report no 
181, Leeds: Corporate Document Services  
 www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rrep181.pdf  , archived at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rrep181.
pdf/ (accessed 21/8/2012). 
 
McSmith A (2012) `Government adviser urges the taxmen to overcharge us` 
Independent, 14 July. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/diary/diary-
government-adviser-urges-the-taxmen-to-overcharge-us-7942387.html 
 (accessed 22/8/2012). 
 
National Audit Office (2009) Report By The Comptroller And Auditor General On HM 
Revenue & Customs 2008-09 Accounts. London: NAO. 
 
National Audit Office (2010) Press Release - HM Revenue and Customs 2009-10 
Accounts London: NAO. 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/press_notice_home/1011/hmrc_2009-10.aspx 
accessed 22/8/2012. 
 
National Audit Office (2011a) A summary of the NAO’s work on HM Revenue & 
Customs 2010-11, London: NAO. 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/1012/reducing_costs_in_hmrc.aspx , accessed 
21/8/2012. 
 
National Audit Office (2011b) HM Customs and Excise Accounts 2010-2011: 
Comptroller and Auditor General’s Report, para 4.5, pR44. London: NAO. 
 
Parliamentary Ombudsman (2005), `Tax Credits – Putting Things Right`, HC124,  
London: HMSO, www.ombudsman.org.uk/improving-public-service/reports-and-
consultations/reports/parliamentary/tax-credits-putting-things-right 
Or http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1115/Tax-Credits-
Putting-Things-Right.pdf  (accessed 21/8/2012). 
20 
 
  
Seddon J and Thornton D (2011) `Universal Credit: a brilliant idea guaranteed to fail` 
http://www.universalcredit.co.uk/universal-credit-a-brilliant-idea-guaranteed-to-fail/ , 
(accessed 27.3.2012). 
 
Shaw J, Slemrod J and Whiting J (2010), `Administration and Compliance`, in J. 
Mirrlees, S. Adam, T. Besley, R. Blundell, S. Bond, R. Chote, M. Gammie, P. 
Johnson, G. Myles and J. Poterba (eds), Dimensions of Tax Design: the Mirrlees 
Review Vol 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
1100-1204. 
 
Sunday Telegraph (2006) Interview with Sir John Bourne, 22 July. 
 
Taylor, M. (1998), Work Incentives: The Modernisation of Britain`s Tax and Benefit 
System, No. 2, London: HM Treasury, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/120.pdf 
(accessed 22/8/2012). 
 
Whiteford, P., Mendelson, M. and Millar, J. (2003), Timing it Right? Responding to 
Income Changes: A Comparison of Australia, Canada and the UK, York: York 
Publishing Services for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
